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New Malware Attack Via WhatsApp Attacking Windows System to Enable Remote Access For Attackers

A new and active malware campaign is spreading through WhatsApp, targeting everyday Windows users across more than a dozen countries. The threat uses malicious script files disguised as routine financial documents, tricking people into running harmful code on their own machines. Once opened, the fil...

· Jun 22, 2026 · 7 min read · 👁 0 views
New Malware Attack Via WhatsApp Attacking Windows System to Enable Remote Access For Attackers

A new and active malware campaign is spreading through WhatsApp, targeting everyday Windows users across more than a dozen countries.

The threat uses malicious script files disguised as routine financial documents, tricking people into running harmful code on their own machines.

Once opened, the file quietly sets off a chain of events that ends with attackers gaining full remote access to the victim’s system.

The campaign was first observed in June 2026 and remains active at the time of reporting. Victims have been identified in Malaysia, Brazil, India, Mexico, Singapore, the United Kingdom, Spain, Taiwan, Australia, Russia, and Vietnam.

Malaysia has been hit the hardest, accounting for roughly 80 percent of all recorded infections. Researchers at Securelist identified and analyzed the campaign in detail.

According to Securelist report shared with Cyber Security News (CSN), the threat actor behind this campaign gained access to real WhatsApp accounts and used them to silently send malicious attachments to everyone in the compromised contact lists.

Since the messages appeared to come from known contacts, recipients were far more likely to open them without suspicion.

Overview of the WhatsApp-based VBScript infection chain (Source - Securelist)
Overview of the WhatsApp-based VBScript infection chain (Source – Securelist)

The attachments are VBScript files, a type of script that Windows can run automatically through a built-in tool called Windows Script Host.

The files carried names like “Financial Reports.vbs,” “Debt Statement.vbs,” and “Account Statement.vbs,” along with versions written in Portuguese, French, German, and Malay.

This multi-language approach strongly suggests the campaign was designed to reach victims in several regions at once.

What makes this attack stand out is its use of legitimate software as the final payload. Rather than deploying a traditional virus or data stealer, the attacker installs a genuine remote management tool on the victim’s machine.

This allows the attacker to control the infected system just like a corporate IT team would, making detection far more difficult.

New Malware Attack Via WhatsApp Attacking Windows System

The infection begins the moment a user opens the VBScript attachment in WhatsApp Desktop or through a browser using WhatsApp Web.

WhatsApp messages containing the malicious VBScript file observed across multiple accounts (Source - Securelist)
WhatsApp messages containing the malicious VBScript file observed across multiple accounts (Source – Securelist)

The script launches silently through Windows Script Host and immediately begins preparing the system for further compromise.

It creates a hidden folder under the Public Documents directory using randomized names like “MSUpdate_random” to avoid attracting attention.

From there, the first script downloads two additional script files from attacker-controlled servers. The first of these tries to modify a Windows security setting known as User Account Control, which normally alerts users before any major system changes are made.

By setting this protection to zero, the attacker clears the path for the second script to install software without any prompts appearing on screen.

The second downloaded script fetches a ZIP archive containing a fully pre-configured installation package for a remote management agent.

Once extracted and executed, this package installs itself silently using Windows Installer and connects back to attacker-controlled servers. At that point, the attacker has persistent and quiet remote access to everything on the victim’s machine.

Signs Pointing to a Chinese-Speaking Operator

Security researchers noted several details within the script files that point toward a Chinese-speaking developer.

Multiple variants of the VBScript contained comments and annotations written in simplified Chinese characters, including references to Windows Update modules and system integrity checks. These comments appeared consistently across different versions of the script.

Infrastructure overlaps also raised flags. One of the attacker-controlled server addresses had previously appeared in connection with malware families known as ValleyRAT and Gh0st RAT.

Extracted Stage 3 Endpoint Central installation ZIP package (Source - Securelist)
Extracted Stage 3 Endpoint Central installation ZIP package (Source – Securelist)

While this does not confirm a definitive link, researchers assess with low confidence that the campaign was likely conducted by a Chinese-speaking operator.

Users are strongly advised to avoid opening any attachments received through WhatsApp, even from known contacts, unless the file has been verified through another channel.

Endpoint Central agent installation via msiexec.exe (Source - Securelist)
Endpoint Central agent installation via msiexec.exe (Source – Securelist)

File types such as VBS, VBE, EXE, BAT, CMD, JS, and PS1 should never be opened without independent confirmation.

Keeping Windows security settings intact and running current endpoint protection can significantly reduce the risk of falling victim to campaigns like this one.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):-

TypeIndicatorDescription
IP Address202.61.160[.]208Attacker-controlled ManageEngine UEMS server
IP Address202.61.160[.]202Attacker-controlled ManageEngine UEMS server
IP Address202.61.160[.]201Attacker-controlled ManageEngine UEMS server (previously linked to ValleyRAT/Gh0st RAT)
IP Address202.61.160[.]160Attacker-controlled ManageEngine UEMS server
IP Address202.61.160[.]137Attacker-controlled ManageEngine UEMS server
IP Address38.55.151[.]63Attacker-controlled ManageEngine UEMS server
Domaintemu.baskwms[.]topMalware distribution domain
Domaininvoice.msopsa[.]topMalware distribution domain
Domainbaoxis[.]ccMalware distribution domain
Domainsdcwww.oss-ap-southeast-1.aliyuncs[.]comPayload hosting (Alibaba Cloud)
Domainbaoyuw2s.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws[.]comPayload hosting (AWS S3)
Domainsjdkjj23.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws[.]comPayload hosting (AWS S3)
Domainxijkwm2.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws[.]comPayload hosting (AWS S3)
Domainyifubafu.s3.ap-southeast-1.amazonaws[.]comPayload hosting (AWS S3)
File Hash (MD5)c7f38cbb99c8b74fa0465293feeba700Financial Reports.vbs
File Hash (MD5)b7cd06c71465038b658a6dc1f273a507Debt confirmation.vbs
File Hash (MD5)9f13c7b8ba391b2f597874e54d310648Electronic statement(A).vbs
File Hash (MD5)993f4c0cadbc769a4b0ed62a918db58dFinancial Reports(s).vbs / FinancialReportsS.vbs
File Hash (MD5)7f81c1bc8cfd588e8998968e2621456eOutstanding Payment List.vbs
File Hash (MD5)7403cbcc5a9c32384d431856dc48fcc9Statement of debt (4).vbs
File Hash (MD5)68c16c46f8afb9e00bbaba0207fb0a46Debt Note (2).vbs
File Hash (MD5)66442f2457eca8f47385b1fb2c6fcab8Statement of Debt(30K).vbs
File Hash (MD5)6359e6236471cbe434d0ef4c42b7f879Applicationform1.vbs
File Hash (MD5)5b6bbcc06cf08cc99e1afeda486d42fbExtrato de Conciliação.vbs
File Hash (MD5)5002eca748205d544618e3bd2dedc223Statement of Debt(29K).vbs
File Hash (MD5)4f0593e8e0e8fac49429e9b45ebf7fa1Outstanding Payment List.vbs
File Hash (MD5)4044e4b6471c9de7b0a4ba37d9d9df9abilling statement (2).vbs
File Hash (MD5)20209b3a32769afc6a75694b8d8839ddStatement of Debt(A).vbs
File Hash (MD5)0ba93109757776a44de9d8c88baa4963Financial Reports(C1).vbs
File Hash (MD5)02bb20455cc592a69c080abac770ce90Le formulaire de demande le plus récent.vbs
File Hash (MD5)6c39900d77dcba158e1d27c7619cb06dOutstanding Balance Sheet(A).vbs
File Hash (MD5)dad708e050632a4280cabf98ac1376b7Outstanding Balance Sheet.vbs
File Hash (MD5)05d188f071d097f5b6bd8138749b4b14Penyata bank.vbs
File Hash (MD5)2c6f05f1f309d89b2236e6c8b59c88f9Account Statement (13K) (2).vbs
File Hash (MD5)3b1aba44dd3d9b6339b6f56e2f42034bStatement of Account.txt
File Hash (MD5)d43fdaa1f0ee09d7e5f0f94ee9df7b6cBitte füllen Sie das Formular…aus.vbs
File Hash (MD5)df4fa0369eaca5cec348be293890d4afAccount Statement.vbs
File Hash (MD5)63ac85195b73753333316a889cf5880fStatement of Account(O).vbs
File Hash (MD5)74fd9f91fc93b6288b4fc253ea5b3e20Sila semak bil anda.vbs
File Hash (MD5)d06333c360b51456f427e616c3c5f8bdSila semak bil anda.vbs (variant)
File Hash (MD5)1d94fbe9cab21278cc3f104bea334d08Promissory_Note(b).vbs
File Hash (MD5)9d9ac85765e4a818a3ccabe2cf4fef82Debt Statement.vbs
File Hash (MD5)6fb6a55424adfb61e31f06aef33273e5dfjieya.vbs
File Hash (MD5)f90ed4b2d0b67114aa89ddfed658e5c0dfjieya.vbs (variant)
File Hash (MD5)8c3322009b8982663c0cbecd9492e7eb0lf.vbs
File Hash (MD5)66705384a7ad81d14c34fc6c054a0ecfiowepv.vbs
File Hash (MD5)8c6d9fc389ad3f20ccbc71d77eb39bfabtksfmsi.vbs
File Hash (MD5)1a3cc75466ffb1971482f7abf7aabc3fhome3.vbs
File Hash (MD5)1c47c63e5ed25060d95359c57c77b107zipats.vbs
File Hash (MD5)31037a42ca048e06e69a78f55bc2eff51122.vbs
File Hash (MD5)7f16449cd0c4862d1eadf8a5742bf09apayload_1.vbs
File Hash (MD5)79ecd61b09b0f2d54b34586c916c4ec9sac8.vbs
File Hash (MD5)7849061c536a3efb05a56d504694e7e76oy.vbs
File Hash (MD5)ddaffe9849f7f3c79f8804adb9a6b3d5kof.vbs
File Hash (MD5)d01cad98dd0d01b75e04e784953c5e2bsleestak_payload_1.vbs

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

Source: CybersecurityNews.com

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