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Iranian APT Uses SEO Poisoning to Deliver Fake SQL Developer Malware Installer

A well-known Iranian threat group has found a new way to push malware onto people’s machines. Instead of sending phishing emails, the group built a fake website that impersonated a real database software download page and used search engine tricks to rank it near the top of results. Anyone who searc...

· May 27, 2026 · 7 min read · 👁 1 views
Iranian APT Uses SEO Poisoning to Deliver Fake SQL Developer Malware Installer

A well-known Iranian threat group has found a new way to push malware onto people’s machines. Instead of sending phishing emails, the group built a fake website that impersonated a real database software download page and used search engine tricks to rank it near the top of results.

Anyone who searched for the tool online and clicked the wrong link walked away with a backdoor quietly installed on their system.

The group behind this activity is Nimbus Manticore, also tracked as UNC1549, and it operates under Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

The group has a long history of targeting software and aviation professionals through career-themed phishing lures. What makes this latest wave different is the use of search engine manipulation as a delivery mechanism, something researchers had not observed from this group before.

Check Point Research analysts identified this activity across three waves between February and April 2026, coinciding with and following the US military campaign against Iran known as Operation Epic Fury.

According to Check Point said in a report shared with Cyber Security News (CSN), the group showed a strong ability to rapidly adapt tools and maintain infrastructure even under active wartime conditions.

The newest wave, which researchers call the “SQL Developer” campaign, unfolded in April 2026. The attackers registered a fake domain called getsqldeveloper[.]com that mimicked a legitimate download page for Oracle’s SQL Developer, a widely used database management tool.

Users who visited the site and attempted a download received a weaponized installer that silently deployed a newly discovered backdoor called MiniFast.

The operation was built on more than just one fake site. The attackers registered dozens of domains that all pointed back to the main fake page, boosting its ranking through link-based signals.

The site also crammed in repeated phrases like “Download SQL Developer” to climb search results. At the time of analysis, the bogus domain appeared near the top of Bing and DuckDuckGo results for the search term “sql developer.”

Iranian APT Uses SEO Poisoning

The shift to SEO poisoning marks a real change in how Nimbus Manticore runs its operations. Their past campaigns nearly always relied on tailored phishing emails with fake job offers aimed at employees in aviation and software companies.

During Operation Epic Fury – Attack Chain (Source - Check Point)
During Operation Epic Fury – Attack Chain (Source – Check Point)

This time, instead of approaching targets directly, the group placed itself in the path of users who were already looking for a trusted piece of software.

The fake site was crafted to look like a real download page. Once a user ran the installer, the infection started quietly in the background using a technique called AppDomain hijacking, which abuses how the .NET runtime loads application configuration files.

Screenshot of the getsqldeveloper[.]com site (Source - Check Point)
Screenshot of the getsqldeveloper[.]com site (Source – Check Point)

This allowed the malicious DLL to execute inside the context of a legitimate, trusted process without raising immediate suspicion.

MiniFast Backdoor and AI-Assisted Development

MiniFast is a 64-bit Windows DLL that functions as a full-featured backdoor built for long-term remote access.

It communicates with attacker servers using structured HTTP endpoints and disguises its traffic by impersonating a Chrome browser through a hardcoded User-Agent string.

Operators can use it to run shell commands, manage files, list running processes, upload data, and even attempt privilege escalation.

Check Point researchers also found clear signs that the malware was developed with help from AI tools. The code includes excessive error handling, verbose function names, and detailed debug messages that are common patterns in AI-generated code.

The group appears to be using large language models to speed up development and push out updated tools faster under wartime operational pressure.

Security teams are strongly advised to monitor for unexpected scheduled task changes and unusual DLL loading behavior, as these are central to the group’s attack method.

Users and organizations should always download software directly from official vendor sites rather than relying on search engine results, since SEO poisoning can push fake pages ahead of genuine ones with little warning.

Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):-

TypeIndicatorDescription
SHA25610fd541674adadfbba99b54280f7e59732746faf2b10ce68521866f737f1e46dMalicious file hash
SHA256eee657ffdb2af8ed6412221e7d5fbf4f5742f2ac2c88f43f12db46af0697de71Malicious file hash
SHA256781605ce9d4a9869e846f6c9657d71437cb6240ab27ffbc4cd550c0e06996690Malicious file hash
SHA2562c214494fd0bad31473ca8adce78a4f50847876584571e66aadeae70827ec2dcMalicious file hash
SHA256f08b17856616d66492a24dced27f788e235f35f42fa7cd10f315000d3a2f4c03Malicious file hash
SHA256a57ffb819fe8d98ff925c5d7b239598fe302acf5a13193d7a535040a71298fdfMalicious file hash
SHA25663d0d3c4a7f71bdbca720903d6a99b832089cc093c64d2938e7e001e56c17ab4Malicious file hash
SHA25674882085db2088356ed7f72f01e0404a0a98cda88ef56fb15ce74c1f36b26d27Malicious file hash
SHA256bc3b44154518c5794ce639108e7b9c5fecb0c189607a26de1aaed518d890c7adMalicious file hash
SHA256ecaf493c320d201d285ef5f61d75744216e47cf1115b4af528f9a78883cc446eMalicious file hash
SHA25644f4f7aca7f1d9bfdaf7b3736934cbe19f851a707662f8f0b0c49b383e054250Malicious file hash
SHA2560db36a04d304ad96f9e6f97b531934594cd95a5cea9ff2c9af249201089dc864Malicious file hash
SHA256485f182f7b74ea4013b2539275a95d21e3a9bf0082c331937af9353a324b36f3Malicious file hash
SHA25664530d7e6ee30e4a66d9eeed6b8595c33fd72f5f73409133ca40539e5695df4cMalicious file hash
SHA256332ba2f0297dfb1599adecc3e9067893e7cf243aa23aedce4906a4c480574c17Malicious file hash
SHA2569e4a658e6d831c9e9bdfe11884a75b7c64812ed0a80e8495ddf6b316505acac1Malicious file hash
SHA25643dc62cef52ebdd69e79f10015b3e13890f26c058325c0ff139c70f8d8eadcfaMalicious file hash
SHA2568808c794c24367438f183e4be941876f1d3ecd0c8d2eb43b10d2380841d2283bMalicious file hash
SHA2565c3362d20229597d11380f56d1f2eb39647fb6afad7be8392a7abcd18dff12f8Malicious file hash
SHA2560291ef318576953f7f3fe287e7775ed1d7c3206119dc7b9cd6d85c02779e6e40Malicious file hash
SHA256d4a7e9f107fe40c1a5d0139c6c6e25bf6bf57f61feff090bee28f476bb3cc3c2Malicious file hash
SHA25638bd137c672bd58d08c4f0502f993a6561e2c3411773d1ae57ee0151a0a9d11dMalicious file hash
SHA256f54cd38632ac9da3af3533ae93e92625cbcb04df521dbf1b6acfaa81218f9e8cMalicious file hash
SHA256b19e06da580cf91691eda066ac9ee4b09c6e5dc26c367af12660fe1f9306eec4Malicious file hash
SHA2569cf029daca89523d917dafed0568d11d00e45ec96b5b90b4a1f7fd4018c7da84Malicious file hash
SHA256a13ba3c5aff46e9daf2d23df4b3e3d49dc7236c207c56f0a1433051f3450d441Malicious file hash
SHA256dfa1e3137a032ee8561a1cd5e1a0f71a10bebb36aef7c336c878638a9c1239eeMalicious file hash
Domainbusiness-startup[.]orgC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainbusiness-startup.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainbusinessstartup.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainbuisness-centeral.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainbuisness-centeral-transportation.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainbuisness-centeral-transportation[.]comC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainlicencemanagers.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainlicencesupporting.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainpeerdistsvcmanagers.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainnanomatrix.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
DomainPremierHealthAdvisory[.]comC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
DomainPremierHealthAdvisory[.]azurewebsites.netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
DomainPremier-HealthAdvisory[.]azurewebsites.netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainramiltonsfinance[.]comC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainramiltonsfinance.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainramiltons-finance.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainglobalitconsultants.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainglobalit-consultants.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainglobal-it-consultants.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainglobal-it-checkers.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainglobal-it-checkbusiness.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainglobal-check-itbusiness.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainglobal-check-business-it.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domainglobalbusiness-checkers-it.azurewebsites[.]netC2 / malicious infrastructure domain
Domaingetsqldeveloper[.]comFake SQL Developer download site used for SEO poisoning

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

Source: CybersecurityNews.com

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