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GoodPersonRAT Uses Fake LetsVPN Installer to Give Attackers Full Remote Control

A fake installer for a popular Chinese VPN service is quietly handing full remote control of infected computers to unknown attackers. The malicious file poses as a setup tool for LetsVPN, a tool many users in China rely on to bypass strict internet blocks. Instead of just installing the VPN, it also...

· Jul 09, 2026 · 5 min read · 👁 2 views
GoodPersonRAT Uses Fake LetsVPN Installer to Give Attackers Full Remote Control

A fake installer for a popular Chinese VPN service is quietly handing full remote control of infected computers to unknown attackers.

The malicious file poses as a setup tool for LetsVPN, a tool many users in China rely on to bypass strict internet blocks. Instead of just installing the VPN, it also drops a hidden remote access trojan researchers have named GoodPersonRAT.

The trick works because the installer contains a real, signed copy of LetsVPN software.

Once the hidden malware finishes its work in the background, the legitimate VPN installs normally, so the victim has no reason to suspect their device has been quietly compromised.

ThreatLocker said in a report shared with Cyber Security News (CSN) that they first spotted this campaign while reviewing suspicious files circulating in the wild.

Their investigation traced the installer back to a single MSI package that hides three separate components, each playing a role in quietly installing spyware on a victim’s machine.

Chain of Execution (Source - ThreatLocker)
Chain of Execution (Source – ThreatLocker)

Once active, GoodPersonRAT gives an attacker almost complete access to the infected system.

It can log keystrokes, watch and control the screen in real time, move files freely, run commands, and even reroute a victim’s internet traffic through a hidden proxy.

Since it never writes its final payload to disk, it becomes much harder for standard antivirus tools to catch and analyze.

GoodPersonRAT Uses Fake LetsVPN Installer

The malicious file, named Kuailianwin-setup.86.msi, contains three hidden pieces working together.

The first is the real LetsVPN installer, kept intact so the victim’s software installs as expected once the attack finishes running quietly in the background.

Legit VPN Installer (Source - ThreatLocker)
Legit VPN Installer (Source – ThreatLocker)

The second file acts as a loader. It reserves a block of memory and reads in a third file, a small data blob that is actually encrypted shellcode.

This shellcode decrypts a much larger hidden program using a simple repeating key, then loads that program directly into memory without saving anything to disk.

That final program is the actual GoodPersonRAT client. It reaches out to one of several backup servers built into the code, choosing between them using a local settings file or, if that is missing, the folder name where it was launched from.

Several server addresses translate from Chinese to the phrase “you are a good person,” which is how researchers settled on the name.

Full Remote Control And Data Theft

Once connected to its server, GoodPersonRAT keeps an open line of communication instead of checking in periodically, letting an attacker send commands at almost any moment.

It can open a live command prompt, transfer files in either direction, capture keystrokes, read clipboard contents, and even watch the screen and move the mouse remotely.

Loader Imported APIs (Source - ThreatLocker)
Loader Imported APIs (Source – ThreatLocker)

The malware also targets messaging apps closely. It specifically goes after Telegram Desktop, copying its session data and quietly rerouting traffic through a server chosen by the attacker, all while patching the app so no warning message ever appears on screen.

To stay hidden, the program checks which security software is running on the machine and adjusts its behavior accordingly. On systems with Microsoft Defender, it goes further and adds exclusions so its own files are never scanned, while also disabling automatic sample submission entirely.

Persistence is handled through a background service and a scheduled task set to run at system startup, ensuring the infection survives a reboot. The malware can even update its own core code by downloading a fresh version from its server whenever the attacker wants new features.

Since the bundled VPN software itself is legitimate and properly signed, only the outer installer file is unsigned and suspicious, which is the one detail careful users should check before running any downloaded setup file.

Anyone downloading VPN tools, especially ones meant to bypass censorship, should verify the source and confirm the installer carries a valid signature.

This campaign shows how attackers exploit trust placed in censorship-bypassing tools to slip past casual scrutiny.

Indicators Of Compromise (IoCs):-

TypeIndicatorDescription
IP Address23.133.4.108C2 server address 
IP Address23.133.4.109C2 server address 
IP Address27.124.40.52C2 server address 
IP Address27.124.9.47C2 server address 
IP Address38.45.124.19C2 server address 
IP Address38.91.114.219C2 server address 
IP Address154.91.75.192C2 server address 
IP Address172.20.10.2C2 server address 
Domainteddkqoo.comC2 domain 
Domainteddkwww.comC2 domain 
Domainxdsansan.comC2 domain 
Domaincunmap.ccC2 domain 
Domainshunlifadacaisansanjlb.comC2 domain 
Domainj6fadacaiaa.comC2 domain 
Domainj6fadacaiai.comC2 domain 
Domainj6llaa.comC2 domain 
Domainj6llaaa.comC2 domain 
Domainj6lluu.comC2 domain 
Domainj6lluuu.comC2 domain 
Domainnishihaoren1.top / nishihaoren1.orgC2 domain 
Domainnishihaoren5.top / nishihaoren5.orgC2 domain 
Domainnishihaoren8.top / nishihaoren8.orgC2 domain 
Domainnishihaoren16.top / nishihaoren16.orgC2 domain 
Domainnishihaoren23.top / nishihaoren23.orgC2 domain 
Domainnishihaoren24.top / nishihaoren24.orgC2 domain 
Domainnishihaoren36.top / nishihaoren36.orgC2 domain 
Domainnishihaoren37.top / nishihaoren37.orgC2 domain 
Domainnishihaoren38.top / nishihaoren38.orgC2 domain 
Domainnishihaoren39.top / nishihaoren39.orgC2 domain 
Domainnishihaoren40.top / nishihaoren40.orgC2 domain 
File NameKuailianwin-setup.86.msiMalicious installer 
File Namepromecefplugilte8.exeShellcode loader 
File Name20260609.datEncrypted shellcode payload 
File Nametelegram.exePatched Telegram Desktop executable 
File NameClientId.sys / Mark.sys / Remark.sys / Group.sysLocal victim identity and status files 
File Namegongzuo.txtKeylogger and clipboard exfiltration file 
File Hash (SHA256)3AD0B2AA1AFE79E95D20AECD1599B524D4D1D5D0972A23D54F778E145EA350CKuailianwin-setup.86.msi 
File Hash (SHA256)6E2AF62358205AC114C047D878A22258AE448B7BD140FCC5B5F9444D008364Fpromecefplugilte8.exe 
File Hash (SHA256)EC3D4D6B0B35E1013C12E0044A8B202D0114809587AA97D83CBAFF68C0E96B820260609.dat 
File Hash (SHA256)4F34E002C9C5916D35C3E32435960E6EF1F8ADFBFE324983F2AAEB09CB8F2D7Patched telegram.exe 

Note: IP addresses and domains are intentionally defanged (e.g., [.]) to prevent accidental resolution or hyperlinking. Re-fang only within controlled threat intelligence platforms such as MISP, VirusTotal, or your SIEM.

Source: CybersecurityNews.com

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